Sheryl G. Snyder
Dec. 8, 2025, 5:08 a.m. ET
- A Kentucky state statute that might give the JCPS superintendent extra authority is at the moment being challenged within the state Supreme Courtroom.
- The Jefferson County Board of Schooling argues the statute is unconstitutional as a result of it solely applies to Jefferson County.
- A ruling towards the statute may doubtlessly invalidate different legal guidelines particular to Louisville and Jefferson County, akin to sure tax legal guidelines.
- The Kentucky Supreme Courtroom has beforehand upheld Louisville-specific statutes, recognizing the distinctive problems with the state’s most populous county.
Can JCPS be ruled successfully?
David A Jones Jr.’s Oct. 14 op-ed makes a persuasive argument in favor of the 2022 state statute that might reform the governance of JCPS by granting extra managerial authority to the superintendent.
However, as Jones identified, the constitutionality of that statute is presently pending earlier than the Kentucky Supreme Courtroom as a result of it applies solely in Jefferson County. Louisvillians needs to be particularly involved in regards to the potential penalties of a choice in that case for different legal guidelines particular to Louisville and Jefferson County.
Two current visitor editorials debated that query. One editorial argued {that a} resolution hanging down the statute may render a number of different Louisville-specific statutes invalid, together with the merger of the Metropolis of Louisville and Jefferson County governments. The opposite editorial strongly disagreed.
Every editorial is half-right and half-wrong. Right here’s why.
Nemes argues if the JCPS statue is unconstitutional, so is the city-county merger
The varsity governance statute at subject applies solely to Kentucky college boards in a county having a consolidated native authorities. The merger of Louisville and Jefferson County is the one such native authorities. Consequently, the statute presently applies solely to JCPS. The Jefferson County Board of Schooling contends the statute, due to this fact, violates the prohibition towards “particular or native” laws within the state Structure.
The state Supreme Courtroom initially dominated towards the board and upheld the statute. However, after a change in its membership, the Courtroom voted 4-3 to rethink that call. The Courtroom just lately heard counsel’s arguments, and a choice is forthcoming quickly.
Rep. Jason Nemes argued in his editorial that, if the JCPS statute is unconstitutional as native laws, then the statute that licensed city-county merger is likewise unconstitutional as a result of that statute additionally applies solely to Louisville and Jefferson County. Nemes additionally argued that the statute authorizing just one college board — JCPS — to levy an occupational tax, and the statute authorizing tax increment financing (TIF) in a single space of Louisville, are unconstitutional if all Louisville-specific statutes are unconstitutional. He has some extent, up to a degree.
College board members counter Nemes’ argument
In a response editorial, the chair and vice chair of the Jefferson County Board of Schooling argued {that a} separate provision of the state Structure solves any downside with the JCPS occupational tax and the Louisville West Finish TIF. But when that constitutional provision was a panacea for all Louisville-specific laws, there could be no query that the college governance statute making use of solely to JCPS can also be not unconstitutional.
In reality, the constitutional provision the board members cite applies solely to these local-specific statutes which relate to the creation and powers of cities. The Board of Schooling shouldn’t be a metropolis. So, that provision doesn’t shield the statute altering the governance of JCPS towards the board’s problem that the statute is unconstitutional “particular or native” laws.
Either side have legitimate factors
The board’s officers additionally argue — appropriately — that the statute authorizing the merger of the Metropolis of Louisville and Jefferson County does, certainly, relate to the group and powers of metropolis authorities. So, a ruling for the board within the pending case wouldn’t invalidate the merged Metro Authorities.
However what in regards to the occupational tax levied by JCPS? That statute applies solely to high school boards positioned in a county having a inhabitants in extra of 300,000 individuals. When it was enacted in 1990, Jefferson County was the one such Kentucky county. Beneath the board’s argument within the pending case, the statute was unconstitutional native laws when enacted as a result of it utilized solely to Jefferson County faculties. Since 1990, Fayette County’s inhabitants has exceeded 300,000. So, is a statute that applies now to 2, however solely two, college boards constitutional, however was unconstitutional when it utilized solely to 1?
And what about Louisville’s West Finish TIF? The state statute creating that TIF exactly describes its boundaries with regards to specified native landmarks. There may be not now, and by no means will likely be, one other native space in Kentucky that qualifies for the actual tax abatement offered by that individual statute. The board contends within the pending state Supreme Courtroom case {that a} statute is unconstitutional if it presently applies to just one Kentucky locale, and whether it is unlikely to ever apply to a different locale. The TIF would, due to this fact, be imperiled by a choice adopting the Board of Schooling’s argument.
Louisville issues can and can range from these of the remainder of Kentucky
The state Supreme Courtroom has, for over a century, upheld a mess of Louisville-specific statutes, deciding that the legislature could deal with issues particular to Kentucky’s most populous county and its solely first-class metropolis. Certainly, a kind of selections upheld the 1971 statute giving the merged city-county Board of Schooling, and solely the Jefferson County Board of Schooling, seven members reasonably than 5, as offered by the overall statute relevant to all different Kentucky college boards.
Whether or not the Supreme Courtroom upholds the brand new college administration statute or strikes it down, Louisvillians ought to hope the Courtroom’s opinion preserves the authority of the legislature to enact statutes addressing issues particular to Louisville and Jefferson County.
Sheryl G. Snyder is a Louisville lawyer. He has represented a number of Kentucky governors in circumstances earlier than the state Supreme Courtroom involving the Structure of Kentucky.
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